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CAN PERMISSIONLESS BLOCKCHAINS BE REGULATED AND 
RESOLVE SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OF COPYRIGHT LAW? 
Guido Noto La Diega and James Stacey* 
Abstract. In October 2018, the European Parliament passed a resolution on distributed ledger 
technologies that recognised blockchains’ potential to disrupt copyright and creative industries. The 
aim of this chapter is to examine blockchain technologies and provide an assessment of their disruptive 
potential upon the legal sphere of intellectual property, and in particular copyright in the music 
industry. In order to do so, this chapter will start off by clarifying that the blockchain does not exist, 
because there are several different types of blockchains and, accordingly, different legal and regulatory 
issues are involved. After identifying the type of permissionless blockchain that is analysed in this 
chapter – that is permissionless, Turing complete, open, distributed, peer-to-peer, transparent, tamper 
resistant and censorship resistant –, we move on to identify the definitional and non-definitional 
features of blockchain technologies. For the blockchain to unleash its disruptive potential, it must be 
clarified whether it complies with existing laws and whether new regulations are needed. Should 
existing regulations be found insufficient, only then a serious discussion around new regulations could 
be started and this should take into account the necessity not to stifle innovation, the level of 
development of the relevant technologies, the importance of involving all the stakeholders and to place 
the discussion at a supra-national level. The focus of the chapter is to critically assess whether public 
permissionless blockchains can be used to disrupt intellectual property law by resolving some of the 
problems in copyright law, with particular regard to the issues of copyright registration, infringement, 
and transactions. It will be shown how the blockchains can resolve the registration issues by allowing 
forms of tamper-resistant, censorship-resistant, user-friendly, and privacy-friendly copyright 
registration. As to infringement, the blockchains can prevent it by making it easier for copyright 
owners to track the use of their works and for music consumers and new intermediaries such as Spotify 
and iTunes to identify the owners, seek a license, and pay the royalties. Finally, smart contracts could 
be used to automate licensing and as forms of digital rights management, but this could be criticised 
from an efficient breach perspective, as well as by pointing out the difficulties of this technology in 
coping with copyright exceptions or defences. It is perhaps too soon to conclude that a 10-year-old 
technology will ultimately disrupt copyright, but there are already some indications that the Ethereum-
type blockchains’ features will radically change copyright by fixing some of its most urgent problems. 
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In October 2018, the European Parliament passed a resolution1 on distributed 
ledger technologies that recognised blockchains’ potential to disrupt copyright. The 
aim of this chapter is to examine blockchain technologies and provide an assessment 
of their disruptive potential upon the legal sphere of intellectual property, and in 
particular copyright in the music industry. In order to do so, this chapter will start off 
by clarifying that the blockchain does not exist, because there are several different 
types of blockchains and, accordingly, different legal and regulatory issues. After 
identifying the type of permissionless blockchain that is analysed in this chapter, we 
move on to identify the definitional and non-definitional features of blockchain 
technologies. For the blockchain to unleash its disruptive potential, it must be 
clarified whether it complies with existing laws and whether new regulations are 
needed. Should existing regulations be found insufficient, only then a serious 
discussion around new regulations could be started and should take into account the 
necessity not to stifle innovation, the level of development of the relevant 
technologies, the importance of involving all the stakeholders, and to place the 
discussion at a supra-national level. The focus of the chapter is to critically assess 
whether public permissionless blockchains can be used to disrupt intellectual property 
law by resolving some of the problems in copyright law, with particular regard to the 
issues of copyright registration and infringement. It will be shown how the 
blockchains can resolve the registration issues by allowing forms of tamper-resistant, 
censorship-resistant, user-friendly, and privacy-friendly copyright registration. As to 
infringement, the blockchains can prevent it by making it easier for copyright owners 
to track the use of their works and for music consumers to identify the owners, seek a 
license, and pay the royalties. Finally, smart contracts could be used to automate 
licensing and as forms of digital rights management, but this could be criticised from 
an efficient breach perspective, as well as by pointing out the difficulties of this 
technology in coping with copyright exceptions or defences. It is perhaps too soon to 
conclude that a 10-year-old technology2 will ultimately disrupt copyright, but there 
seem to already emerge some indications that the blockchains’ features of being 
                                                             
1 European Parliament resolution of 3 October 2018 on distributed ledger technologies and 
blockchains: building trust with disintermediation (2017/2772(RSP)). 
2 The foundations for the blockchain were laid out by Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer 
electronic cash system. 
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permissionless, distributed, transparent, without a single point of failure, tamper-
resistant, and peer-to-peer will radically change copyright by fixing some of its more 
urgent problems. 
 
2. Does the blockchain exist? 
 
Arguably, the blockchain does not exist; there are several different types of 
blockchains, each with different legal issues. 
This said, a good starting point is the technological overview presented by the 
US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in October 2018.3 
Blockchains are defined as ‘distributed digital ledgers of cryptographically signed 
transactions that are grouped into blocks.’4 After an agreement is reached on the 
validation of a new block, the latter is added to the chain and cryptographically linked 
to the previous one. The participants will notice if someone tries to tamper with a 
transaction inscribed in a block (tamper evidence) and the older a block is the more 
difficult it is to tamper with it (tamper resistance). The distributed character of the 
blockchains derives from the fact that every participant has a full copy of the chain 
and ‘new blocks are replicated across copies of the ledger.’5 However, not all 
blockchains are fully distributed. Indeed, a major distinction in this field is between 
permissionless blockchains and permissioned ones. The main example of the former 
is BitCoin where every user can view all the transactions, has a full copy of the chain, 
and in principle has the same power as the other participants (peer-to-peer). 
Permissioned blockchains, in turn, are not peer-to-peer, disintermediated, and fully 
transparent because there are administrators or consortia granting user permissions.6  
This chapter focuses on a permissionless blockchain that it is open, 
distributed, peer-to-peer, transparent, tamper resistant and censorship resistant. The 
resistance to censorship derives from the lack of a central point of failure; being 
distributed, it is virtually impossible to take down content, because even if a node 
                                                             
3 Dylan Yaga, Peter Mell, Nik Roby, and Karen Scarfone, Blockchain Technology Overview (NIST 
2018). 
4 Ibid 1. 
5 Ibid 1. 
6 Ibid 53. 
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goes down, the rest of the network still stands.7 The blockchain whose legal issues we 
are exploring is not, however, a BitCoin-type blockchain. Indeed, even though we are 
referring to a permissionless technology, since we want to apply it to be multi-
purpose, we have in mind an Ethereum-type blockchain.8 The latter is Turing 
complete and therefore more versatile than the BitCoin, which can be used only for 
simple transactions and does not allow users to build smart contracts – protocols to 
automatically execute actual contracts9 – on top of it.10 
 
3. Core and Non-definitional Components of Blockchain 
Technologies 
 
It is important to note that there are differing opinions as to which features of 
blockchain technology are strictly definitional and not subject to change.11 However, 
this chapter is of the opinion that ‘blockchain technology’ is actually an umbrella term 
for three distinct technologies combined, not all of which will remain apparent in 
every deployment of blockchain-based applications.12  
The first of those three technologies is the blockchain itself, as a way to 
structure data. What makes a blockchain unique is its use of cryptography. By 
utilising certain cryptographic functions a blockchain is able to create a persistent, 
tamper-evident record of any item of data, and authenticate the identity of the parties 
involved in each transaction.13 Unsurprisingly, a blockchain is a definitional feature of 
                                                             
7 See Sermpinis, Thomas, and Christos Sermpinis. "Traceability Decentralization in Supply Chain 
Management Using Blockchain Technologies." arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.09203(2018). 
8 Cf. Nathaniel Popper, ‘Understanding Ethereum, Bitcoin's Virtual Cousin’ (The New York Times, 2 
October 2017). 
9 On the limitations of smart contracts see Mik, E. (2017). Smart contracts: terminology, technical 
limitations and real world complexity. Law, Innovation and Technology, 9(2), 269-300. 
10 Cf. Brent, Lexi, Anton Jurisevic, Michael Kong, Eric Liu, Francois Gauthier, Vincent Gramoli, 
Ralph Holz, and Bernhard Scholz. "Vandal: A scalable security analysis framework for smart 
contracts." arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.03981 (2018). 
11 Joshua A.T. Fairfield, ‘Bitproperty’ (2015) 88 (4) SCL Rev 805, 808 Considers the fact that a 
‘Distributed public ledger …does not require trust in other parties or in a central list authority’ to be a 
definitional feature; Kevin Werbach and Nicolas Cornell, 'Contracts Ex Machina' (2017) 67 (2) Duke 
Law Journal 313, 326 also considers a ‘distributed ledger of transactions’ to be synonymous with a 
blockchain. 
12 Thijs Maas, ‘What is Blockchain Technology?’ (Lawandblockhain.eu, 21 June 2017) 
<www.lawandblockchain.eu/post-template/> accessed 29 January 2018. 
13 UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Distributed Ledger Technology: beyond block chain 
(Government Office for Science 2017) 17. 
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blockchain technology that will be apparent in each and every blockchain 
application.14 
The second element is the network. Early applications of blockchain 
technology such as Bitcoin and Ethereum operate on a publicly visible, 
permissionless blockchain that is distributed across a peer-to-peer network.15 In that, 
anything that happens on a blockchain is a function of the network as a whole. A 
network of computers known as ‘nodes’16 manage the network jointly, meaning that 
there is no central authority.17 In this type of blockchain, anyone can become a node 
and the entire contents of the blockchain are publicly visible. However, this is not to 
say that every application of blockchain technology will be this way. Distributed peer-
to-peer networks, or those that are public or permissionless may not be necessary or 
even permissible in certain circumstances. Alternative applications include networks 
that are ‘private’ or ‘permissioned’, where participation is limited to a certain group 
of users and can only be viewed by specified parties. It is often predicated that the 
blockchain is a trustless system,18 in that participants can transact without necessarily 
trusting each other and without intermediaries (e.g. banks). However, this can be said 
only with regards to permissionless blockchains. In permissioned blockchains, 
conversely, there is likely to be an aspect of trust among the users required as there 
will be some element of ‘centralisation’.19 Venture capital-backed Ripple is one 
example of a blockchain application that has amended the underlying technology to 
operate in an environment where a degree of trust is required for transactions to be 
validated.20 Governments are also exploring the idea of blockchains using a 
                                                             
14 Thijs Maas, ‘Blockchain: the 3 Core Components’ (LinkedIn, 24 October 2017) 
<www.linkedin.com/pulse/blockchain-3-core-components-thijs-maas> accessed 29 January 2018 
15 Jean Bacon and others, 'Blockchain Demystified' (2017) Queen Mary University of London, School 
of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 268/2017 4 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3091218> accessed 
29 January 2018. 
16 These are the computers that are connected to the blockchain network. All blockchain-based 
applications are made up of nodes. However, who can become a node, and the level of involvement 
that is permissible by each node will differ depending on the type of blockchain application deployed. 
Nodes store a local copy of the blockchain. ‘Full’ nodes store a copy of the blockchain in its entirety, 
while ‘light’ nodes only hold a portion of the blockchain needed to verify transactions, Bacon (n 14) 
11. 
17 Ameer Rosic, 'What is Blockchain Technology? A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners' (Blockgeeks, 
2016) <https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-blockchain-technology/> accessed 3 February 2018. 
18 Yaga (n 2) 38 underlines, however, that trust is needed even in supposedly trustless systems, e.g. 
trust in the cryptographic technologies and that users are not colluding in secret. For other critical 
remarks, see Carl, Uggla, and Hallström Carl-Johan. "Is It as Trustless as They Say?: A Functional 
Analysis of the Blockchain and Trust." (2018). 
 19 Bacon (n 14) 6. 
20 UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (n 11) 18. 
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centralised trusted third party. Estonia for example has utilised blockchain technology 
since 2012 to help maintain the integrity of data across health, judicial and legislative 
areas.21 For these reasons, this chapter considers public, permissionless distributed 
peer-to-peer networks to be a fundamental characteristic of early blockchain-based 
applications rather than a definitional feature that is apparent in all versions of 
blockchain technology. Nonetheless, when we do not specify otherwise, a reference to 
the blockchain must be understood as a reference to a permissionless distributed peer-
to-peer network, since these characteristics have the potential to disrupt, or at least 
profoundly affect, the law, and copyright in particular. 
The final component is the consensus mechanism, i.e. a ‘process to achieve 
agreement within a distributed system on the valid state.’22 Consensus is what enables 
the nodes in a distributed peer-to-peer network to work together without having to 
know or trust each other. The consensus mechanism is a set of rules that are agreed 
upon by the network of nodes running the software in which the rules regulate the 
addition of new blocks.23 These rules ensure consistency across the network, and that 
participant/system behaviour is valid and appropriate.24 Given that consensus 
mechanisms solve problems of trust in distributed peer-to-peer networks,25 it follows 
that if the deployment of a blockchain application is anything other than distributed, 
such a consensus mechanism may not be required. Therefore, this chapter considers 
consensus mechanisms to be a fundamental characteristic of early applications that 
may change dependant on the purposes for which the technology is adopted, rather 
than a definitional feature apparent in all blockchain-based applications. Nonetheless, 
since the distributed character of the blockchain is likely to have a disruptive impact 
on the law, and on copyright in particular, we will refer to blockchains using a 
consensus mechanism, unless stated otherwise. 
 
 
                                                             
21 'E-Estonia — We Have Built a Digital Society and So Can You' (e-Estonia) <https://e-estonia.com/> 
accessed 7 February 2018. 
22 Yaga (n 2) 50. The main consensus mechanisms are proof of work, round-robin, and proof of stake. 
The latter is used in Ethereum and can be either Byzantine fault tolerant proof or chain-based. 
23 Maas, ‘Blockchain: the 3 Core Components’ (n 13). 
24 Bacon (n 14) 13. 
25 Consensus mechanisms, however, do not always lead to correct execution results, because 
participants may be affected by economic interests in the smart contracts, as pointed out by Chen, L., 
Xu, L., Gao, Z., Lu, Y., & Shi, W. (2018). Tyranny of the Majority: On the (Im) possibility of 




4. Of regulation and other limitations to the blockchains’ 
uptake 
 
For the blockchains to unleash their potential, in the music industry and 
beyond, the regulatory conundrum must be untangled. Overly restrictive regulation 
may stifle innovation, but the lack of any regulation may lead to legal uncertainty, 
which in turn would slow down the adoption of the blockchains.26 The regulatory 
treatment of blockchain or of some of its aspects and applications will be a major 
factor in determining the level of success the technology will have regarding all its 
use cases. Given the importance of blockchains’ regulation and being music copyright 
highly regulated, it is necessary to dig deeper and explore the regulatory treatment of 
blockchain in general.  
The more blockchain becomes widespread, the more lawmakers develop an 
interest in regulating it. Most existing regulations, policies, and case law take a top-
down approach and focus on Bitcoin and, accordingly, on evidence and tax issues.27 
The most common approach, however, is to assess whether and how existing laws 
apply to the blockchains28 and avoid the introduction of new regulations ‘given that 
the technology is still evolving and practical applications are limited both in number 
and scope.’29 Contrary to popular belief, blockchains are not a lawless technology; 
recent research underlined that we should abandon the naivety whereby blockchain 
                                                             
26 On the balance between innovation and regulation with regards to the blockchains see Joel Telpner, 
The lion, the uncorn, and the crown. Striking a balance between regulation and blockchain innovation 
(Blockchain Research Institute 2018). 
27 For example, the EU Court of Justice exempted Bitcoin transactions from VAT because they regard 
‘currency, bank notes and coins used as legal tender’ (Skatteverket v David Hedqvist Skatteverket v 
David Hedqvist, Case C-264/14). For the focus on evidence, see Arizona Revised Statutes, 44-7061, 
and  
28 In the UK, for example, the Financial Conduct Authority believe that most Initial Coin Offerings 
(ICOs) are unregulated, but they take a case-by-case approach to decide whether ICOs fall within their 
remit. Financial Conduct, Consumer warning about the risks of Initial Coin Offerings (‘ICOs’) (FCA 
2017). 
29 European Securities and Markets Authority, Report The Distributed Ledger Technology Applied to 
Securities Markets (ESMA 2017) 4. In the US, a similar ‘wait-and-see’ approach has been taken by the 
Federal Reserve Board, as well as the Federal Reserve Banks of New York and Chicago; see Mills, 
David, Kathy Wang, Brendan Malone, Anjana Ravi, Jeff Marquardt, Clinton Chen, Anton Badev, 
Timothy Brezinski, Linda Fahy, Kimberley Liao, Vanessa Kargenian, Max Ellithorpe, Wendy Ng, and 
Maria Baird (2016). “Distributed ledger technology in payments, clearing, and settlement,” Finance 
and Economics Discussion Series 2016-095. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.095. Cf., similarly, Financial Industry Regulatory 




transactions would be ‘free from the travails of conventional law, thus offering the 
promise of grassroots democratic governance without the need for third party 
intermediaries.’30 Most of existing laws apply to the blockchains, but should new 
regulations be introduced, a participatory and holistic approach would be preferable. 
Indeed, it is important to involve all the stakeholders and keep in mind all the 
potential socio-legal issues if one wants to ensure that the blockchain unleashes its 
full potential and benefits all the players involved. 
Bitcoin, the first and most widely used blockchain, set out to remove state 
institutions influence on currency. Permissioned blockchains inherited the features of 
being intrinsically trans-national and (potentially) state-free, which begs the 
fundamental questions on whether it is at all possible to regulate them and if so, 
how.31 Bitcoin and blockchain have moved on from the cypherpunk days,32 where the 
community using Bitcoin and the like were mostly made up of individuals with 
libertarian and anti-establishment political stances.33 Nowadays, Bitcoin has entered 
the mainstream, even becoming a legal payment method in Japan.34 Blockchain, in 
turn, has stepped out of Bitcoin’s shadow and now offers a wide variety of potential 
use cases, some of which promise to be revolutionary.35 However, for blockchain to 
realise its full disruptive potential it will need to appease the legal and regulatory 
environments in which it will operate.36 Indeed, beyond cryptocurrency, blockchain 
has potential application across a number of heavily regulated industries, which have 
been designed without blockchain in mind. This may ultimately mean that the use of 
blockchain could be found to be incompatible with the current regulatory 
                                                             
30 Karen Yeung, ‘Regulation by Blockchain: The Emerging Battle for Supremacy between the Code of 
Law and Code as Law’ (forthcoming) Modern Law Review. 
31 These problems, however, are not new, since the internet is transnational and yet is highly regulated. 
Recent research has showed that most of the physical world rules can be applied in cyberspace, though 
there is a clear problem of which authority can legitimate regulate it (Chris Reed and Andrew Murray, 
Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Cyberspace (Elgar 2018)).  
32 See Jameson Lopp, 'Bitcoin and the Rise of the Cypherpunks' (CoinDesk, 9 April 2016) 
<www.coindesk.com/the-rise-of-the-cypherpunks/> accessed 22 March 2018. 
33 Stefan Stankovic, 'An Introductory Guide to Cryptocurrency Regulation' (Unblock, 15 January 2018) 
<https://unblock.net/cryptocurrency-regulation/> accessed 22 March 2018. 
34 Jonathan Garber, 'Bitcoin Spikes after Japan says it's a Legal Payment Method' (Business Insider, 3 
April 2017) <http://uk.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-price-spikes-as-japan-recognizes-it-as-a-legal-
payment-method-2017-4?r=US&IR=T> accessed 22 March 2018. 
35 See generally Melanie Swan, Blockchain: Blueprint for a New Economy (1st edn, O’Reilly 
&Associates 2015. 




framework.37 If so, the uncertainty that this incompatibility inevitably creates will no 
doubt restrict innovation and ultimately prevent large scale adoption of blockchain 
into these areas. In order to successfully navigate these heavily regulated industries, it 
would seem necessary that regulation is seen as a tool to provide certainty for those 
involved in blockchain’s development and encourage innovation, rather than one used 
by the regulators38 to stifle it.39 The problem does not regard, however, only regulated 
industries but all sectors where personal data is processed. Indeed the EU General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force in May 2018, introduces 
principles, obligations, and rights whose implementation can be difficult if at all 
possible in a blockchain context.40 For example, data subjects have the right to rectify 
their personal data, but once the data is in the blockchain is virtually impossible to 
change it.41 
Part of the literature is of the opinion that regulation of blockchain is 
inevitable, and in the end the community of developers will in fact welcome such 
regulation. According to this view, regulators will win the developers round by 
accepting creative solutions to achieve the right balance between protecting the 
relevant public interest objectives and stimulating innovation.42 The rationale behind 
said opinion is based on the fact that the same scenario happened twenty years ago, at 
the early stages of the Internet. The more recent phenomenon of the platform 
economy43 has also reinforced how this scenario plays out.44 Uber for example, whom 
                                                             
37 Michele Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union' (2017) Max Planck Institute 
for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 18-01 2 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3080322> accessed 22 March 2018. 
38 Where not otherwise specified, the term ‘regulators’ is used generically to refer to any law-makers 
and regulators across jurisdictions, whether they operate a transnational, supranational, national or 
subnational level. 
39 'Blockchain—Key Legal and Regulatory Issues' (n 35). 
40 See, e.g. Berberich, Matthias, and Malgorzata Steiner. "Blockchain Technology and the GDPR–How 
to Reconcile Privacy and Distributed Ledgers, 2 Eur." Data Prot. L. Rev 422 (2016): 426 and Herian, 
Robert. "Regulating Disruption: Blockchain, GDPR, and Questions of Data Sovereignty." Journal of 
Internet Law22, no. 2 (2018): 1. 
41 Cf. the solutions proposed by Ibáñez, Luis-Daniel, Kieron O'Hara, and Elena Simperl. "On 
Blockchains and the General Data Protection Regulation." (2018); and CNIL, Blockchain. Premiers 
éléments d’analyse de la CNIL (Commission nationale de l'informatique et des liberté 2018). 
42 Kevin D. Werbach, 'The Song Remains the Same: What Cyberlaw Might Teach the Next Internet 
Economy' (2017) 69 (3) Florida Law Review 887, 889. 
43 See generally Martin Kenney and John Zysman, 'The Rise of the Platform Economy' (2016) 32 (3) 
Issues in Science and Technology. 
44 Cf. Noto La Diega, Guido. "Uber law and awareness by design. An empirical study on online 
platforms and dehumanised negotiations." Revue européenne de droit de la consommation/European 
Journal of Consumer Law 2016, no. II (2016): 383-413. 
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were once notoriously reluctant to co-operate with regulators45 have now actively 
sought regulatory intervention regarding insurance legislation that applies 
unanimously across the United States,46 and as of March 2018, they have instructed 
insurance companies in order to comply with those requirements.47 
If regulation is inevitable, the next question is how to regulate? Going 
forward, it would seem that successful regulation is dependent on a number of factors. 
First of all, the regulators need to learn from their past mistakes regarding other 
emerging technologies and be sure not to repeat them. Although blockchains remain 
an immature technology with evolving use cases, it is arguable that early regulatory 
acknowledgement and interest should be seen as positive as it is important to be 
mindful of the negative impact that delayed interest in an emerging technology can 
have.48  
Second, successful regulation is not only dependent on the regulators 
themselves. Rather, the industry and those involved with the development of 
blockchain should also actively collaborate with each other and the regulators to 
tackle the complex challenges at hand.49 If those involved in the development of 
blockchain do decide to resist regulatory attempts, it is suggested that ‘[i]f anything, 
the innovators stand to lose the most by delaying government involvement in 
adopting reasonable solutions.’50 
The third factor concerns the level at which blockchain is regulated. 
Generally, regulators regulate the use of a technology as opposed to regulating the 
technology itself. However, blockchains’ ever-growing use cases mean that regulators 
are finding it difficult to regulate.51 Yet, some scholars suggest that this remains the 
best approach, and claim that a use case focused approach is supported by the 
                                                             
45 Frankie Arvelo, 'RESIST – Uber and Subverting Regulations' (The Bespoke Lawyer, 10 March 2017) 
<www.bespokelawyer.com/resist-uber-and-subverting-regulations/> accessed 28 March 2018. 
46 Uber, 'Insurance Aligned' (Uber Newsroom, 24 March 2015) 
<www.uber.com/newsroom/introducing-the-tnc-insurance-compromise-model-bill/> accessed 26 
March 2018. 
47 Uber, 'An Update on Insurance' (Uber Newsroom, 1 March 2018) <www.uber.com/newsroom/an-
update-on-insurance/> accessed 26 March 2018. 
48 As noted by Michele Finck, 'Blockchain Regulation' (2017) Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition Research Paper No. 17-13 20 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3014641> accessed 26 March 
2018, the early stages of the Internet’s development suffered the negative impact of a delayed interest. 
49 ibid. 
50 Werbach, 'The Song Remains the Same’ (n 39) 889. 
51 'Blockchain—Key Legal and Regulatory Issues' (n 35). 
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experience with other emerging technologies such as the Internet.52 If such an 
approach is to be successfully adopted, the aforementioned collaborative effort of all 
the parties involved in that specific use case will be key. Not only that, the 
unpredictability of blockchain will require a flexible, open approach to each use case 
that will allow the law to develop as and when the technology does.53  
That being said, even if flexible, agile, use specific regulation is developed, if 
that regulatory model is only applicable in one country, its positive impact may be 
limited. The distributed potential of blockchain, coupled with its intangibility means 
that its application could operate simultaneously over multiple jurisdictions. This may 
mean that it is unclear who is performing the regulated activity. If this proves to be 
the case, regulators may struggle to determine whether or not a particular blockchains 
activity’s need to be regulated and if so, under which jurisdiction. Further, if 
something goes wrong, it may prove difficult to determine the precise location and 
identity of the culprit for whom is responsible for said breach or failure.54 Therefore, 
successful regulation will also require regulators to engage in transnational 
conversation and cooperation in an attempt to formulate some sort of consistent 
collaborative governance.55 Although international conventions would appear the 
most suitable level of regulation, practically it is unlikely that an agreement will be 
reached and that, if reached, the rules will be fit for the blockchains or for the 
particular use that will be taken into consideration.56  
In conclusion, no regulation is better than bad regulation. More evidence is 
needed to clarify whether existing regulations suffice when it comes to the 
blockchains. Should existing regulations be found insufficient, only then a serious 
discussion around new regulations could be started and should take into account the 
necessity not to stifle innovation, the level of development of the relevant 
technologies, the importance of involving all the stakeholders, and to place the 
                                                             
52 Julie A. Maupin, 'Mapping the Global Legal Landscape of Blockchain Technologies' (2017) 149 
CIGI Papers 5. 
53 Finck, 'Blockchain Regulation' (n 45) 2. 
54 'Blockchain—Key Legal and Regulatory Issues' (n 35). 
55 Peter Yeoh, 'Regulatory Issues in Blockchain Technology' (2017) 25 JFRC 196, 200. 
56 On the problem of ‘legal hysteresis’, i.e. the delay with which innovation is necessarily regulated 
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discussion at a supra-national level. Only this way, legal certainty may be achieved 
and the blockchains may unleash their disruptive potential.  
Whilst regulation is one of the main issues preventing the blockchains’ uptake, 
there are other limitations. Some are not specific to the blockchains, for example the 
fluctuations in the value of cryptoassets and the problem of network effects, whereby 
this technology is still too niche to become commercially successful.57 However, the 
former has not prevented the success of BitCoin and other cryptocurrencies. The latter 
is true for every new technology and there are no reasons to think that blockchains 
will not become so widely adopted to take advantage of network effects. On the 
contrary, since the blockchain could provide a very advanced protection to copyright, 
owners of works outside the system would have a hard time securing the same level 
of protection, providing an incentive for all rightholders to register.58 A major 
limitation of blockchain is that it cannot store the actual copyrighted document in its 
current form. It stores a cryptographic artefact that identifies the material as it existed 
at a particular point in time.59 This leads to the problem of the possible double-
spending of the asset offline:60 the rights on a song could have been assigned to a 
third party outside of the blockchain and still be linked to the old owner on the 
blockchain. Whilst this is a problem that currently does not have a satisfactory 
solution, it must be said that there is growth in systems that enable the tracking of the 
consumption of digital contents, regardless of whether they are on the blockchain or 
anywhere else. An example of this is KodakOne, that uses both blockchain and AI-
powered recognition technologies to make sure that nobody is using registered 
photographs without the owner’s permission.61 Finally, there is the problem of 
‘garbage in garbage out.’62 The blockchain itself does not guarantee authenticity of 
                                                             
57 Michèle Finck and Valentina Moscon, ‘Copyright Law on Blockchains: Between New Forms of 
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(2018) 28 AIPJ 2. 
60 Finck and Moscon (n 57). 
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information not native to the blockchain.63 If incorrect information on copyright 
ownership is added to the chain, it will be virtually impossible to correct it. Even 
though also human experts are susceptible to the “garbage in, garbage out” 
phenomenon,64 it can be accepted that this is the main issue preventing the 
widespread adoption of the blockchain. An ex-ante screening mechanism is required 
to ensure that the original party is the genuine owner prior to creating the timestamp.65 
This mechanism could be provided by the traditional music copyright intermediaries, 
e.g. collecting socities. 
 
5. The disruptive potential of blockchain on copyright law 
 
Having defined blockchain technology and set out the technical and regulatory 
essentials, the rest of this chapter will concern the disruptive potential that blockchain 
may have upon the legal sphere of intellectual property, using music copyright as a 
use case.  
This section is focused on intellectual property and in particular copyright, i.e. 
the body of law that protects aesthetic and artistic creations such as literary, musical, 
dramatic, and artistic works.66 Blockchain technologies can affect copyright in 
manifold ways, as recognised by the European Parliament’s resolution of 3 October 
2018 on distributed ledger technologies and blockchains: building trust with 
disintermediation. The EU institution underlines that distributed ledger technologies 
can be used to track and manage intellectual property thus facilitating copyright and 
patent protection.67 It further acknowledges the technology’s potential to develop 
artists’ ownership through an ‘open public ledger that can also clearly identify 
ownership and copyright’68. It is then recognised that in collaborative and open 
innovation contexts (e.g. 3D printing) the blockchains’ capability to link creators to 
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their works is of the utmost importance.69 Finally, authors can benefit from 
transparency and traceability in the use of their works, as well as the smoothening of 
royalty distribution and increase in revenues that can be expected by cutting down on 
intermediaries.70 On the last point, it is important to critically note that the 
blockchain’s promise to eliminate traditional intermediaries is unlikely to be 
fulfilled.71 Evidence of the trend towards re-centralisation are the investments of the 
traditional intermediaries in the blockchain72 and the rise of permissioned 
blockchains, where the disintermediation is only partial.73 
Although it is still unclear whether the blockchains will revolutionise 
copyright, it can be argued that they can resolve some of the issues that affect this 
body of law and the relevant industries, with particular regards to copyright 
registration, infringement (popularly known as ‘piracy’), transactions, management.74 
For the sake of brevity, this section will focus on how, if at all, the type of blockchain 
described in section 2 above can resolve some of the problems of copyright 
registration, infringement, and transactions. 
 
5.1. Blockchains for a privacy-friendly, agile, tamper- and censorship-
resistant registration 
 
One of the main innovations brought by the Berne Convention75 has been that 
copyright arises with the creation of the work (e.g. once a book has been written), 
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without the need for any formalities i.e. systems of public registration.76 Such 
formalities enabled governments to control ex ante the contents of the books, thus 
enabling them to censor those works that went against the governmental policies or 
the dominant ethical values.77 The abolition of registration formalities is positive 
because it favours the authors by making copyright easily obtainable and by reducing 
the opportunities for governments to censor them. However, without registration there 
are evidentiary problems in copyright infringement proceedings, because it is hard to 
prove who created what and in which moment in time.78 For example, if John shares 
without Jerry’s permission a picture the latter had posted on Instagram, how does 
Jerry prove that he created said work (the picture), that he did it before John, and that 
he is the sole legitimate author and owner? To resolve these kinds of problems, some 
countries such as the US effectively sidestepped the Berne Convention and de facto 
re-introduced the copyright registration. Indeed, even if copyright arises with the 
creation of a work, in infringement proceedings statutory damages and attorney’s fees 
will not be awarded in the absence of registration.79 In the UK, there is no such 
limitation, but without registration said evidentiary issues remain. Therefore, new 
registration mechanisms have been introduce to ensure evidence, however they often 
are a burden for the author (e.g. they are expensive and not user-friendly) and they 
can be forged; particularly with paper ledgers there is a ‘high level of forgery.’80 
Alongside the problems of censorship, forgery, and lack of user-friendliness, existing 
registration systems are open to criticism from a privacy perspective. This is the case 
of the US, where rules of procedure of the Copyright Office and attitudes of the US 
District Courts make it very hard for pseudonymous and anonymous authors to be 
successful in infringement lawsuits.81 
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All these problems can be resolved through a blockchain-enabled copyright 
registration. Indeed, a blockchain platform could issue a token, which would serve as 
proof of authenticity, in which a timestamped copyright registration is contained. 
Arguably, such a disruptive system would enable a cheaper, transparent,82 and user-
friendly registration.83 Thus, it would also be addressed the problem of forgery, being 
the blockchain tamper-resistant.84 Moreover, one of the key features of permissionless 
blockchains is that they do not have a no single point of failure. Therefore, if an 
author deposited a work to register it and a government wanted to take it down for 
censorship purposes, this would be practically impossible85 because ‘(e)ven if several 
nodes failed, the network would still continue to function,’86 and the work would still 
be available since all data is maintained by all nodes.87 Finally, moving on to 
anonymous and pseudonymous authors’ privacy, a public, permissionless blockchain 
distributed across a peer-to-peer network may resolve their problems by providing 
robust digital pseudonyms, ‘a mask that, while hiding (the author’s) real identity, 
would nonetheless be unique to him or her.’88  
A blockchain registration would be optional thus complying with the Berne 
Convention, and it would ensure the benefits of traditional registration in terms of 
evidence in infringement proceedings, whilst preventing its drawbacks in terms of 




                                                             
82 As noted by Savelyev (n 61) 550, ‘blockchain can introduce long-awaited transparency in matters of 
copyright ownership chain.’ 
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5.2. Blockchains and copyright infringement: an ambiguous relationship 
 
Copyright infringement, popularly known as ‘piracy’, is a widespread issue, as 
exemplified by the fact that 53% of young users access music illegally89 and by the 
fact that new intermediaries such as Spotify often make available music without its 
owners’ consent, allegedly because they do not know who the owners are.90 
Copyright infringement thrive for a number of reasons, two of which can be 
addressed by the blockchain. The first one is the difficulty for the copyright owners to 
track the use of their works. Once a song is published, the owners currently have 
limited or no means to know who is accessing it and how. The problem is exacerbated 
by the sharing practices that are becoming commonplace in the time of social media. 
Indeed, it can be said that we live in the sharing society,91 where sharing copyright 
material is easy particularly on social networking sites e.g. by retweeting someone’s 
tweet which, in turn, had retweeted someone else’s tweet.92 This means not only that 
many people infringe copyright possibly without being aware of it, but also that after 
repeated sharing and linking it is difficult to track back who was the original owner. 
Ultimately, the difficulty for the copyright owner to track the use of their contents 
decreases the incentives to access contents legally, since end-users have the 
reasonable expectation that the owners cannot track the consumption of their content 
and, therefore, they cannot enforce their rights.  
The second reason why copyright infringement is so common, particularly in 
the music industry, is that it is often impossible to know who the author and owner 
is.93 This is because there is not a requirement to register copyright, and, more 
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importantly, because of the lack of a single updated database of music metadata. 
Music metadata are data about who did what in music. Music metadata are 
fragmented in databases that do not sync and that are owned by corporations with 
conflicting views about what should be public and what should, in turn, kept private.94 
Music ownership is extremely complex for legal and business reasons. On the one 
hand, under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 198895 – the main UK statute on 
copyright – a single song has at least three owners, i.e. the author of the lyrics, the 
author of the music, and the producer of the sound recording. From a business point 
of view, music is a collaborative enterprise; indeed, most ‘recorded music is a 
collaboration between songwriters, singers, musicians, producers, recording 
engineers, mastering specialists.’96 All these subjects and other new intermediaries 
such as Spotify and iTunes have a stake in the industry and some expectations in the 
distribution of music’s revenues. For these reasons the artists receive only a limited 
share of the revenues and after a long time.97 If artists are finally paid a slice of the 
‘royalties cake’, this reaches them between 6 and 18 months after the publication.98 
The problem of music’s attribution and royalty distribution are not new, but they are 
made worse by new technologies and new ways of consuming musing. While at the 
time of vinyl records and CDs it was easy to understand who contributed and how, 
iTunes, Spotify etc. create a credits conundrum where the listener knows only who is 
the singer and nothing else. A final reason why identifying the copyright owner (and 
reward them) is difficult is that even though there is a presumption the author (of the 
music, of the lyrics, etc.) is the owner of the relevant work,99 this is often not the case 
either because the work had been made in the course of employement and therefore 
owned by the employer or because ownership has been transferred to third parties by 
means of a contract of copyright assignment. These contracts are often accompanied 
by the so-called paternity waiver, whereby the author gives up their right to be 
acknowledged as the author.100 If copyright paternity can be waived, it is likely that it 
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will be, because the relevant relationships in many creative industries are often 
characterised by an imbalance of bargaining power.101 For all these reasons, music is 
often consumed without the owners’ permission and the system does not reward 
artists sufficiently and timely, if at all.  
Permissionless blockchains could tackle both issues. A blockchain based 
music platform, such as Mycelia, can allow artists to issue a token that can be 
transferred only when the owner signs off on the transaction with their private key. 
This disincentivises end-users from accessing music illegally. As to the music 
metadata’s conundrum, a public, permissionless blockchain distributed across a peer-
to-peer network may resolve the problems of copyright infringement by enabling the 
creation of a global updated database of music metadata. The blockchain could be the 
backbone of a decentralized, open-source global platform, controlled by no single 
entity, and with the potential to contain accurate, real-time, global data encompassing 
credits and rights ownership.102 As noted by some scholars, most copyright registry 
are territorial, but the creation of a global registry would not require governments to 
trust other government or third parties, ‘(r)ather, trust can be placed in the 
mathematical certain provided by blockchain technology.’103 Moreover, blockchain 
could be a technological mean to prevent practically nullify the practice of imposing 
paternity waivers, thus contributing to fixing the structural imbalance of power of the 
creative industries, music included. Once recorded in a blockchain platform, no one 
could contest the authorship and ownership. 
In making it easier to access copyright content legally, the blockchain can 
prevent copyright infringement. At the same time, however, it can constitute a 
problem because, in light of the distributed nature of the blockchain and its lack of 
single point of failure, infringing content cannot be taken dow: once it is on the 
blockchain, it is stored in every node potentially forever.104 In recent years, the 
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prevailing way that copyright owners react to copyright infringement is not bringing 
lawsuits against the end-users or the actual infringer, but targeting the intermediaries 
that enable said infringement (e.g. the internet service providers, such as BT or 
Sky).105 However, in permissionless blockchains in principle there are no 
intermediaries or, better, the latter have a different, more elusive identity. The virtual 
impossibility to take down once on the blockchain and the inherent disintermediation 
is likely to make it difficult to enforce copyright. However, the disruptive potential of 
the blockchain may manifest itself in preventing infringement altogether by allowing 
copyright owners to track the use of their works and by powering a global updated 
database of music metadata, which will make royalty distribution smoother and fairer. 
 
5.3. Smart contracts and the right to change one’s mind 
 
The concept of smart contract predates the blockchain and was first presented 
in 1994 by Nick Szabo who defined it as ‘a computerized transaction protocol that 
executes the terms of a contract.’106 The promise of automated execution has become 
even more alluring with the new generation of smart contracts, that are a collection of 
code and data (…) that is deployed using cryptographically signed transactions on the 
blockchain network.’107 Indeed, these new smart contracts inherit all the features of 
the underlying blockchain infrastructure, including ‘the tamperproof nature (…) that 
anchors their automated execution.’108 In a music copyright context, smart contracts 
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could be used for several purposes, such as to automate the execution of a licence109 
or as a form of digital rights management (DRM).110  
Whilst the use of blockchain-based smart contracts in copyright can be praised 
or criticised for a number of reasons,111 this chapter will assess their compatibility 
with a principle that we deem inherent to our legal system, i.e. the right to change 
one’s mind. Contract law is designed to recognise such a right. This can be inferred 
by the compensatory nature of damages pursuant to the theory of efficient breach, and 
the prevalence of damages over specific performance. Since smart contracts ‘prohibit 
or make more costly efficient breach,’112 should their adoption be encouraged? 
The English legal system is one of several systems where contractual parties 
can walk away from the agreement without being penalised in the form of punitive 
damages or prevented to change their mind in the form of specific performance 
remedies.113 This can be seen as a reflection of the theory of efficient breach, whereby 
if a party can get better use of their resources by breaching the contract, then they 
should be able to without being penalised.114 More precisely, the breach is ‘efficient, 
and therefore desirable, if the promisor’s gain from breach, after payment of the 
promisee’s expectation damages, will exceed the promisee’s loss.’115 The theory is 
usually accepted as a justification for the current approach to remedies.116  
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Even though the existing scheme of remedies for breach of contract in English 
law can be justified on non-efficiency based grounds,117 it can be submitted that the 
preference for compensatory damages over punitive damage and specific performance 
shows adoption of a theory of efficient breach. With the exception of debt, the 
common law remedy for a breach is that of damages.118 These damages have the 
function to compensate for the loss, whereas punitive damages – where the award 
goes beyond the loss in order to penalise the breaching party – have no place in the 
law of contract, regardless of how outrageous the defendant’s conduct has been.119 
The right to change one’s mind is reflected also in the fact that the jurisdiction to 
order specific performance is supplementary to common law damages,120 and specific 
per5formance will not be granted where damages provide adequate relief.121 It must 
be said, however, that injunctions can be seen as a form of indirect specific 
performance and yet they have become increasingly common, even in circumstances 
where the court would not order specific performance.122 Although injunctions can be 
used to encourage performance, they are confined by a twofold restriction. First, there 
must be an express contractual clause whereby the party obliged themselves not to do 
something (an express negative stipulation).123 Second, the injunctive relief cannot 
have the effect of forcing the defendant to fulfil a contract for personal service or to 
abstain from any business whatsoever and for too long a term.124 
It would seem, therefore, that in light of the right to change one’s mind, smart 
contracts’ deployment is not desirable. One could object that these self-executing 
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protocols could be programmed in order to allow a party to breach them under certain 
circumstances and the consequent reaction could follow efficient breach principles. 
However, it does not seem possible to decide ex ante (and accordingly encode) when 
the breach is efficient,125 and such a complexity could lead to vulnerabilities.126 More 
generally, if the automated execution can be discontinued in the event of a breach, 
this would defeat the whole purpose of using smart contracts. 
The breach of a copyright licence can be seen as both a breach of contract (e.g. 
the royalties have not been timely paid) and as copyright infringe. This would be the 
case if the licensee went beyond the limits of the licence, for instance if the work has 
been used beyond the agreed expiration or for purposes other than those provided in 
the licence (e.g. the right to copy had been licensed, but the licensee communicated 
the work to the public). In the former scenario, the ordinary principles of contract law 
will apply and, therefore, the aforementioned considerations about the right to change 
one’s mind enshrined in contract law can be reiterated here. If copyright infringement 
is at issue, in turn, things may differ. Copyright in a work is infringed if the defendant 
carried out a restrict act (e.g. reproduction)127 without a valid licence128 with regards 
to a substantial part of the claimant’s work,129 if a causal link between the former and 
the defendant’s work is established.130 In an infringement action, the owner and the 
exclusive licensee131 can seek damages, injunctions, accounts or any property-related 
remedy.132 The latter reference has been read as including an order for specific 
performance.133 Moreover, there are additional damages in the event of flagrancy,134 
injunctions against internet service providers,135 delivery up,136 order for disposal,137 
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and seizure.138 Since blockchain technologies can be used as a form of digital lock or 
DRM,139 it is important to note that the circumvention of these locks is accompanied 
by the same remedies as copyright infringement itself.140 Damages are based on the 
actual prejudice suffered by the rightholder,141 but the Court of Justice of the EU ruled 
that Member States can introduce punitive damages.142 However, in the UK, damages 
have a compensatory function and they will not be awarded if the defendant did not 
know or had no reason to believe that copyright subsisted in the works.143 Although 
not technically punitive damages,144 the claimant can seek additional damages, if the 
defendant of the conduct was deceitful or treacherous,145 and having regard of the 
benefits accruing to the defendant by reason of the infringement.146 Without 
downplaying the importance of additional damages, it should be nonetheless 
recognised that their relevance is limited since they are often sought but rarely 
granted.147 
In addition to the damages, claimants can seek injunctions, often to prevent 
further infringing activities. However, being an equitable remedy, courts may exercise 
their discretion and not grant them, for example if there is an undue delay in 
commencing proceedings.148 It is expressly provided that courts can decide to replace 
injunctions with damages.149 Finally, courts will not grant an injunction if damage is 
an appropriate remedy.150 Additionally, rightholders can seek injunctions against 
internet service providers, for example asking Sky to block access to an infringing 
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website.151 The questions to be asked, as summarised in 1967 Ltd v British Sky 
Broadcasting,152 are as follows: is the defendant a service provider? Do the website’s 
users and operators infringe copyright? Do they use that website to do so? Has the 
defendant actual knowledge of the above? Whereas an assessment of whether 
damages would be more appropriate could take place when courts assess whether the 
sought injunctions are proportionate, effective, and dissuasive, there seems to be a 
clear trend of granting blocking injunctions.153  
In conclusion, smart contracts seem to be contrary to the right to change one’s 
mind that characterises our contract law. This affects also its use in copyright 
licensing, since some dispute may regard a breach of licence as breach of contract. 
However, when the breach is such that the defendant carried out a restricted act 
beyond the scope of a licence, then copyright infringement principles will apply. In 
the copyright sub-system, the preference for compensatory damages over specific 
performance is not as clear as it is in contract law. Damages themselves are 
compensatory, but they can be accompanied by additional damages in the event of 
flagrancy. These are not technically punitive, but they certainly go beyond the typical 
compensatory function of damages. The rise of injunctions, finally, can be seen as an 
indirect way to favour specific performance. If this is the case, then the right to 
change one’s mind is less strong in a copyright context and, at least from this point of 
view, the adoption of smart contracts should not be resisted. However, this should be 
cautiously, because contracts are often used to exclude copyright exceptions or 
defences (e.g. text and data mining).154 Efficient breach could be a solution, because 
the ‘application of efficient contract remedies may alleviate the apparent tension 
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between the private contract and intellectual property limitation regimes.’155 
However, this new generation of smart contracts make breach virtually impossible, 




The blockchain, at least in its permissionless form, has the potential to disrupt 
copyright law by resolving two of its problems, namely registration and infringement. 
Currently there are no reliable registers of copyright ownership, which creates 
problems of evidence because it is difficult for claimants to prove the link between 
them and the infringed work, as well as to prove the time of creation. Current 
registration systems are prone to forgery, can be used as a means of censorship, are 
cumbersome, and are unfavourable to anonymous authors. A blockchain-based 
registration mechanism would resolve this problem by providing the means for a 
tamper-resistant, censorship-resistant, user-friendly, and privacy friendly platform. 
As to copyright infringement or piracy, this is on the rise because owners 
cannot track the use of their works and because it is often difficult to know who the 
owners are, which in turn makes it virtually impossible to seek a license and pay the 
royalties. However, using the blockchain, artists could decide to transfer music by 
transferring a token signing off on the transaction with their private key. No 
unauthorised use would be possible. The blockchain, moreover, would allow the 
creation of global constantly updated music metadata that would make it easier to find 
and reward the copyright owners. 
Thirdly, blockchain-based smart contracts could automate the execution of 
licenses as well as constitute a new generation of digital locks. When a breach of 
licence qualifies as a breach of contract, the use of smart contracts can be criticised 
because it is contrary to the right to change one’s own mind, which is a key principle 
in contract law. Conversely, when a breach of a licence qualifies as copyright 
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infringement and when DRM is circumvented, then that argument does not apply 
because copyright law penalises the changing of one’s ideas through additional 
damages and injunctions. Whilst smart contracts, therefore, could be a positive 
introduction in the copyright world, this should happen cautiously, because there is 
the risk that their use will lead to an overprotection of copyright as a consequence of 
undue restrictions on exceptions or defences, 
It is too early to assess whether blockchains will disrupt the music industry 
and fix all the problems of copyright, a body of law whose inadequacy for the digital 
age is striking.156 From the analysis above, however, it would seem that blockchains 
could contribute to the resolution to some problems encountered by copyright owners 
and authors. In order to succeed, these potential solutions must be accompanied by a 
twofold caveat. First, the immature blockchain technology must overcome its 
technical issues to prove, beyond doubt, that it is a better proposition than the 
technology it is replacing. Second, it will have to appease the current regulatory 
framework to allow these technological advancements to achieve large-scale 
adoption. Whilst new regulations are not necessarily the best way forward, regulators 
should work closely with law academics and industry stakeholders to clarify how 
existing laws apply to this new technology. Indeed, without legal certainty, the 
blockchains are unlikely unleash their disruptive potential. 
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